For Brutus Was an Honest Man: Ethics and Morality

   

What does it mean when we call somebody a good person?

This question is an essential one to answer — for if we can but once understand how we might respond to it, we shall, perhaps, be better disposed to make ourselves into better people. I have a proposed response to this question — but before we delve too deeply into it, I should like to make the reader o well aware that I am merely attempting to understand the ways in which we speak of people as “good” in ordinary language.

       I have divined that we speak of people as good in two different ways. In the first place, we speak of them as good if we hold that they have a “good” world-view or else good values — thus, for instance, a Democrat might say that somebody who holds such opinions as being for gay marriage is a good person in this sense, and, conversely, a Republican might say that somebody who supports school prayer is a good person. In essence, we call somebody good in this way, because we believe that they hold good values, which they have developed and maintained by (ideally speaking) long intellectualreflection thereupon. This aspect of the good individual, I propose to call the moral side.

       In the second place, we speak of somebody as good if they habitually perform good actions. Thus, people who are morally Democrats or Republicans, Utilitarians or Kantians, Hedonists or Stoics, although they may differ as to their moral values, would nevertheless be likely to call, albeit for different reasons, somebody who devotes large amounts of his or her personal time to helping the poor and needy a good person inthis sense. Yet just as one false move does not consign an individual to the fate of being a “bad person,” so too we must understand that a few good actions do not automatically make one a “good person.” Rather, one must continue to do good until the act of doing good becomes so intertwined with one’s identity such that it begins to form an integral part of a person’s character. This aspect of the good individual, I propose to call the ethical side.

       Very often, we hold that it is sufficient enough for a person to be “good” only in one or the other sense before we rashly pronounce them to be a “good person,” but nothing could possibly be further from the truth — for it is not complete, if one should wish to be a good person, simply to be good in a moral sense or in an ethical sense, even if one be completely neutral in the other aspect. For it is a simple matter to be morally good without developing one’s ethical side — if one holds well-reasoned moral opinions, and yet, in a trying moment, cracks under pressure (because he or she is unaccustomed to it) and thus does something bad, then we shall see how little worth moral goodness is by itself. Indeed, in extreme cases, moral individuals may be completely given to ethical lassitude even when not under pressure: I have had the pleasure of listening to many people declaim that it is right to give a large amount of one’s income to the poor in order to help close the great wealth-gap that presently exists in this country; whenever they are asked why they do not practice what they preach, however, they, by the subtlest of arguments and casuistry, manage to demonstrate that they are exceptions to the moral rule to which they supposedly cleave. Thus, we might say of people who are good morally, but neutral or bad ethically, to be guilty of the sin of hypocrisy.

       An example of an ethically good person who is not necessarily morally good is a little more difficult to think of, but the following example should suffice. Let us say that there is a factory owner who is accustomed to paying his workers a high wage, and habitually goes down to the floor to speak with them, listen to their plaints and grievances and extends to them any aid he possibly can. This person, we might say, is ethically good, insofar as he or she is accustomed to act in what anybody, from the outside looking in, would probably deem a “good way.” And yet, it is entirely possible that this factory owner be without any moral values in this respect whatsoever, for he could be treating the workers as kindly as he does, simply out of a desire for them to work harder and produce more; thus, he would be driven by the materialistic motive to maximize profit, and not by a moral motive to do good. Because society as a whole, in determining the goodness of individuals, is more concerned that they display good outwardly rather than that they possess it inwardly, I must confess that I cannot find a ready-made word that would accurately describe the fault of this particular individual — but I do believe that it would not be unfair of me to say that one who is good ethically, and yet neutral or bad morally, would be guilty of the sin of apathy, at best, and that of dissimulation, at worst.

       Therefore, one ought to call another good only when he or she both is in possession of strong moral values and habitually and reliably performs actions that are consistent with his or her moral values. To call anybody a good person if they are found lacking in either of these two aspects would be a grave error indeed.  

Alex Chen is a College senior from Palo Alto, California